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GRAPHICAL POTENTIAL GAMES
YAKOV BABICHENKO AND OMER TAMUZ
Abstract. We study the class of potential games that are also
graphical games with respect to a given graph G of connections
between the players. We show that, up to strategic equivalence,
this class of games can be identified with the set of Markov random
fields on G.
From this characterization, and from the Hammersley-Clifford
theorem, it follows that the potentials of such games can be decom-
posed to local potentials. We use this decomposition to strongly
bound the number of strategy changes of a single player along a
better response path. This result extends to generalized graphical
potential games, which are played on infinite graphs.
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21. Introduction.
Potential games form an important class of strategic interactions.
They includes fundamental interactions such as Cournot oligopolies
(see, e.g., [13]), congestion games (see, e.g., Monderer and Shapley [13]
or Rosenthal [18]), routing games (see, e.g., Rosenthal [18]) and many
others. The above mentioned interactions are frequently local in na-
ture. Namely, there exists an underlying graph such that the payoff
of a player depends on her own strategy and on the strategies of her
neighbors, but does not depend on the strategies of the opponents who
are not neighbors. For instance, the locality of the interaction could be
geographical: In routing games, the outcome of a driver depends only
on her own route and the routes that were chosen by drivers who are ge-
ographically close to her. In a Cournot oligopoly where transportation
costs are high, a firm is competing only with firms which are geograph-
ically close (for instance, this is the case with natural gas market; see
Victor, Jaffe and Hayes [22]). The idea of the locality of an interaction
is captured by the notion of a graphical game, introduced by Kearns
et al. [12]. These games and similar ones are also sometimes called
network games; see Jackson and Zenou [10] for an extensive survey.
The goal of this paper is to understand the class of graphical po-
tential games. First, we address the following questions: What char-
acterizes the potential function of a graphical potential game? What
characterizes the payoffs of the players in a potential graphical game?
In Theorems 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5 we provide a complete answer to these
questions. We show that
(1) The potential function of a graphical potential game can be ex-
pressed as an additive function of local potentials, where each
local potential corresponds to a maximal clique in the underly-
ing graph, and the value of the local potential is determined by
the strategies of the players in the maximal clique only. This
condition is necessary for a potential game to be graphical, and
every such potential is the potential of some graphical game.
(2) Up to strategically equivalent transformations (see definition 4.3),
the payoff of a player is the sum of the local potentials of the
cliques to which she belongs.
The proof of these results is achieved by showing that, for a fixed
graph G, the set of potentials of graphical games on G can be identified
with the set of Markov random fields on G (see Section 3.4). The latter
are a well studied class of probability distributions with certain graph-
ical Markov properties. Having established this correspondence, the
3Hammersley-Clifford theorem [9], a classical result on Markov random
fields, yields the above characterization of graphical potential games.
Next, we use this characterization to study dynamics. A central class
of dynamics that has been studied in the context of potential games is
(strict) better-response dynamics, where at each period of time a single
player updates her strategy to a (strictly) better one, with respect to
the current strategies of the opponents; the basic observation regarding
all potential games is that better-response dynamics always converge.
Such a sequence of unilateral improvements is called a better response
path. We address the question: Are there properties of better response
paths that are unique for graphical potential games? We focus on the
number of updates of a single player along a better response path, and
we prove in Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.6 that under mild uniformity
assumptions on the game, and for graphs with slow enough growth (see
Definition 5.5), the number of updates of each player is bounded by a
constant, which in particular is independent of the number of players.
This result is general and holds for all the above mentioned examples.
Example 5.7 demonstrates that the slow-enough-growth condition is
tight, in some sense.
Finally, in Section 6, we introduce generalized graphical potential
games on infinite graphs. These are graphical games which are not
necessarily potential games, but still have a local potential structure.
We prove here the same bounds on strict better-response paths. We
note that these results, as well as the results on finite graphs, translate
to novel results on Markov random fields, which may be of interest
outside of game theory.
1.1. Related Literature. Potential games and graphical games are
both fundamental classes of games (see, e.g., Nisan [15]). There has
recently been a growing interest in the intersection of these two classes,
because many interesting potential games have a graphical structure
(see e.g., Bilo` et al. [3] or Bimpikis, Ilkilic and Shayan [4]), and many
interesting graphical games have a potential function (see e.g., Auletta
et al. [1], Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’amours [5]). However, to the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to fully characterize the
intersection of these two classes1.
Best-response and better-response paths in potential games were
studied in Fabrikant, Papadimitriou and Talwar [7], Skopalik and Vo¨cking [20]
and Awerbuch et al. [2], where the focus is on the length of the paths.
Our result (Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.6) focuses on the number of
1In an independent, later work Ortiz [16] addresses a similar characterization
problem.
4changes of a single player. This aspect of better- and best-response
dynamics also plays an interesting role in graphical games of strategic
complements; see Jackson and Zenou [10].
The connection between graphical potential games and Markov ran-
dom fields was previously observed for specific cases; see Auletta et
al.[1], who establish a connection between the logit dynamic in a par-
ticular class of graphical potential coordination games and Glauber
dynamics in the Markov random field of the Ising model. We show
that this connection is much more general and extends to all graphical
potential games.
Another intriguing connection between graphical games and Markov
random fields was established by Kakade et al. [11], who show that ev-
ery correlated equilibrium of every graphical game is a Markov random
field. Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [6] use Markov random fields to
compute pure Nash equilibria in graphical games.
There is a vast literature on majority dynamics, which can be in-
terpreted as best-response dynamics of the majority game on a graph,
which is a graphical potential game. Tamuz and Tessler [21] upper
bound the number of changes in majority dynamics on slowly growing
graphs. We adapt their technique in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Acknowledgments. The authors would like to thank Elchanan Mos-
sel for some enlightening comments.
2. Example.
Before diving into the definitions and results, we provide the reader
with a simple, informal example of a graphical potential game, and of
a generalized graphical potential game. These will be games of pure
network externalities.
Let V be a finite set of players located at the nodes of a graph
G = (V,E). Let some of the edges in E be blue and the rest be red.
Pairs of players connected by a blue edge will benefit from choosing
the same strategy, and pairs connected by a red edge will benefit from
choosing different strategies. In particular, there are two strategies, and
each player gains a unit of utility for each blue neighbor that chooses
the same strategy, and loses a unit of utility for each red neighbor that
chooses the same strategy.
This is a graphical game: the utility of each player is independent of
the choices of those who are not her neighbors.
Given a strategy profile, consider the number of blue edges along
which the two players choose the same strategy, minus the number of
blue edges along which the two players choose different strategies. This
5function of strategy profiles is readily seen to be a potential for this
game, and thus this game is a graphical potential game.
We can define the same game for the case in which the set of players
is countably infinite and the graph G is locally finite (i.e., each player
has a finite number of players). In this case the game clearly still a
graphical game. However, it is no longer a potential game. Still, in
some ways this game resembles a potential game, and in particular is
has a “local potential structure”. Accordingly, it falls into the class of
generalized potential games (Definition 6.1).
An additional sense in which this game resembles a potential game
is that it has pure equilibria (Theorem 6.2). However, unlike potential
games, this game has infinite better response paths. A natural question
is: given a particular player, does there exist a better response path in
which this player makes infinitely many strategy changes? It turns out
that the answer to this question depends on the graph G. We show
that for some infinite graphs (for example, graphs with subexponential
growth rates) each player changes strategy only a finite number of
times, as in a finite potential game (Theorems 6.3 and 6.4). This
bound on the number of changes also applies to large finite graphs
(Theorem 5.3), so that, for some sequences of growing graphs, the
maximum number of strategy changes does not depend on the size of
the graph.
3. Definitions.
3.1. Games. Let G be a game played by a finite set of players V , and
denote n = |V |. Let Si be the finite set of strategies available to i ∈ V ,
and denote the set of strategy profiles by S =
∏
i Si. Let ui : S → R
be player i’s utility function, which maps strategy profiles to payoffs.
Note that we do not allow payoffs in {−∞,∞}.
3.2. Graphical games. We identify V with the set of nodes of a sim-
ple, undirected graph G = (V,E). The game G is a graphical game on
G if each player’s utility is a function of the strategies of her neighbors
in G. This can be formally expressed by the following condition on
the utility functions. Choose from each Si an arbitrary distinguished
strategy oi. Given a ∈ S, denote a
i = (a1, , . . . , ai−1, oi, ai+1, . . . , an).
Definition 3.1. G is a graphical game on G if
i 6= j and (i, j) 6∈ E ⇒ ∀a ∈ S , ui(a) = ui(a
j).(3.1)
It is easy to verify that this definition does not depend on the choice
of {oi}i∈V .
63.3. Potential games.
Definition 3.2. G is a potential game if there exists a (potential) func-
tion Φ: S → R such that for all i ∈ V and a ∈ S
ui(a)− ui(a
i) = Φ(a)− Φ(ai).(3.2)
Note that if Φ is a potential for G then Φ +C is also a potential for
G, for any C ∈ R. We make a canonical choice and assume always that∑
a∈S
eΦ(a) = 1.(3.3)
The rational behind this choice will become apparent below. Here we
use the fact that utilities (and hence potentials) cannot be infinite. It
is easy to see that given a potential game, all its potentials differ by a
constant.
3.4. Markov random fields. Let G = (V,E) be a finite, simple,
undirected graph. Associate with each i ∈ V a random variable Xi,
and denote X = (X1, . . . , Xn). X is called a random field on G.
Let U and W be subsets of V . A subset A ⊂ V is a (U,W )-cut in
the graph if every path from U to W must pass through A. For any
subset Z ⊂ V define the random variable XZ = {Xi : i ∈ Z} to be
the restriction of X to Z.
Definition 3.3. X is a Markov random field (MRF) if, for every
(U,W )-cut A it holds that conditioned on XA, XU is independent of
XW .
The random field X is said to be positive if its distribution is equiv-
alent (in the sense of mutual absolute continuity) to the product of its
marginal distributions. For discrete distributions, this is equivalent to
requiring the event (X1, . . . , Xn) = (a1, . . . , an) to have positive prob-
ability whenever all of the events Xi = ai have positive probability.
For positive random fields, Markov random fields can be character-
ized by a weaker condition, namely that for every pair i 6= j ∈ V such
that (i, j) 6∈ E it holds that, conditioned on XV \{i,j}, Xi is indepen-
dent of Xj. While this seems to be a well-known fact, we were not
able to find a reference for its proof, and therefore provide it (for finite
distributions) in Appendix A.
4. Characterization of graphical potential games.
4.1. Decomposing graphical potential games. Our first result shows
that the potential of a graphical potential game can be decomposed into
local potentials.
7For W ⊆ V and a ∈ S, let aW ∈
∏
i∈W Si be the restriction of a to
W , given by (aW )i = ai, for i ∈ W .
Denote by C(G) the set of maximal cliques in G; these are cliques
which are not subsets of strictly larger cliques.
Theorem 4.1. Let a game G be both a graphical game on G and a
potential game with potential Φ. Then Φ can be written as
Φ(a) =
∑
C∈C(G)
ΦC(aC),(4.1)
for some functions ΦC :
∏
i∈C Si → R.
The functions ΦC are called local potentials.
Before proving this proposition we introduce the Hessian Φij and
prove a lemma. For a ∈ S and i, j ∈ V , denote
aij = (a1, . . . , ai−1, oi, ai+1, . . . , aj−1, oj, aj+1, . . . , an).
We recall that oi is an arbitrary distinguished strategy of player i. Note
that (ai)j = (aj)i = aij = aji.
Let Φi : S → R be given by
Φi(a) = Φ(a)− Φ(a
i).
Alternatively, by (3.2), Φi(a) = ui(a)− ui(a
i).
The Hessian Φij : S → R is given by
Φij(a) = Φi(a)− Φi(a
j) = Φ(a)− Φ(ai)− Φ(aj) + Φ(aij).
Lemma 4.2. Let a game G be both a graphical game on G and a
potential game with potential Φ. Then Φij = 0 for all (i, j) 6∈ E.
Proof. Choose (i, j) 6∈ E. Then by (3.1) we have that ui(a) = ui(a
j)
and that ui(a
i) = ui(a
ij). Hence
0 =
[
ui(a)− ui(a
j)
]
−
[
ui(a
i)− ui(a
ij)
]
=
[
ui(a)− ui(a
i)
]
−
[
ui(a
j)− ui(a
ij)
]
= Φi(a)− Φi(a
j)
= Φij(a).

Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let P be a probability distribution over the set
of strategy profiles S given by
P [a] = eΦ(a).(4.2)
By (3.3) this is indeed a probability distribution. LetX = (X1, . . . , Xn)
be a random field on G with law P. Then Xi is a (random according
8to P) strategy played by player i. Note that X is a positive random
field, although a priori it may not be Markov.
We will prove the theorem by showing that for every (i, j) 6∈ E, the
random variablesXi andXj are independent, conditioned on {Xk}k 6∈{i,j}.
This will prove that X is a Markov random field over the graph G,
and so the claim will follow immediately from the Hammersley-Clifford
Theorem (see Hammersley and Clifford [9], and also Grimmett [8], Pre-
ston [17] and Sherman [19]) for positive MRFs, which states that P be
can decomposed as
log P [X = a] =
∑
C∈C(G)
ΦC(aC),
for some functions ΦC :
∏
i∈C Si → R.
Choose (i, j) 6∈ E. Then by Lemma 4.2 we have that, for every
a ∈ S,
Φ(a) + Φ(aij) = Φ(ai) + Φ(aj).
By (4.2), this can be written as
P [X = a] · P
[
X = aij
]
= P
[
X = ai
]
· P
[
X = aj
]
.(4.3)
Denote by X ij(a) = {Xk = ak}k 6∈{i,j} the event that Xk = ak for all
k 6∈ {i, j}. Then we can write (4.3) as
P
[
Xi = ai, Xj = aj,X
ij(a)
]
· P
[
Xi = oi, Xj = oj,X
ij(a)
]
= P
[
Xi = oi, Xj = aj,X
ij(a)
]
· P
[
Xi = ai, Xj = oj,X
ij(a)
]
.
Hence
P
[
Xi = ai, Xj = aj
∣∣X ij(a)] · P [Xi = oi, Xj = oj∣∣X ij(a)]
= P
[
Xi = oi, Xj = aj
∣∣X ij(a)] · P [Xi = ai, Xj = oj∣∣X ij(a)] .
Summing over all possible values of ai and aj we arrive at
P
[
Xi = oi, Xj = oj
∣∣X ij(a)]
= P
[
Xi = oi
∣∣X ij(a)] · P [Xj = oj∣∣X ij(a)] .
Finally, we recall that the choice of {oi}i∈V was arbitrary, and so Xi
and Xj are independent, conditioned on {Xk}k 6∈{i,j}. 
4.2. Potentials of graphical potential games. Theorem 4.1 states
that if a potential game is graphical, then the potential has the form
(4.1). We cannot hope to have the opposite direction (i.e., if the po-
tential function has the form (4.1) then the game is graphical) because
of the following observation: If we add a constant payoff of c to player
i whenever player j 6= i plays a certain strategy aj , then the potential
9function does not change; on the other hand, if in the original game
player j’s strategy does not influence player i’s payoff (i.e., there is no
edge (i, j) in G), then in the new game (with the additional payoff of
c) this is no longer the case. Such a change preserves the potential
function but not the graphical structure. Therefore, we cannot de-
duce a result on the graphical structure of the game from the potential
function.
However, the above mentioned change is a special type of change of
the game in the following sense: it does not cause any strategic change
in the game, because whether or not player i receives an additional
payoff of c 6= 0 does not depend on her own behavior. This motivates
the notion of strategically equivalent games introduced by Monderer
and Shapley [13]. Denote by S−i the set of strategy profiles of players
in V \ {i}.
Definition 4.3. Two games G and G ′ with payoff functions u and
w over the same strategy profile set S are called strategically equiva-
lent if there exist functions f1, ..., fn where fi : S
−i → R such that
ui(a) = wi(a) + fi(a−i). We say that G is a strategically equivalent
transformation of G ′.
Note again, that since the additional payoff of fi(a−i) does not de-
pend on player i’s behavior, the transformation causes no strategic
change. In particular, any (mixed) Nash equilibrium of G is a (mixed)
Nash equilibrium of G ′.
We next show that up to a strategically equivalent transformation
of the game, the decomposition (4.1) is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a potential game to be graphical.
Theorem 4.4. A potential game G with potential Φ is strategically
equivalent to a graphical game on G if and only if the potential Φ has
the form
Φ(a) =
∑
C∈C(G)
ΦC(aC).(4.4)
.
Proof. If G is strategically equivalent to a graphical game G ′ on G, then
G ′ is also a potential game with the same potential function Φ, because
a strategic equivalent transformation preserves the potential function
(see Monderer and Shapley [13]). By Theorem 4.1 Φ has the form (4.4).
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For the opposite direction, let Φ be of the form (4.4), and consider
the game G ′ where player i’s payoff is defined by
ui(a) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC).(4.5)
We show that G ′ is a potential game on the graph G with the potential
Φ. This will complete the proof, because G and G ′ have the same
potential, and therefore are strategically equivalent (see Monderer and
Shapley [13] again).
Since (ai)C = aC whenever i 6∈ C, we have that ΦC(aC)−ΦC((ai)C) =
0 whenever i 6∈ C. Hence
ui(a)− ui(a
i) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC)− Φ((ai)C)
=
∑
C∈C(G)
ΦC(aC)− Φ((ai)C)
= Φ(a)− Φ(ai),
where the first equality follows from (4.5), the second equality follows
from the observation above, and the third from the fact that Φ has the
form (4.4).
Finally, to see that G is a graphical game over G, note that for
(i, j) 6∈ E we have that (aj)C = aC for all C ∈ C such that i ∈ C.
Hence
ui(a)− ui(a
j) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC)− ΦC((aj)C)
=
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC)− ΦC(aC)
= 0.

4.3. Payoffs of graphical potential games. Theorem 4.1 charac-
terizes the potential function of a graphical potential game, but it does
not characterize the payoff functions of the players in such a game.
We next present an exact characterization of the payoff functions in a
graphical potential game. For every player i ∈ V let N(i) be the set of
neighbors of player i, excluding i. Denote by SN(i) the set of strategy
profiles of players in N(i).
Theorem 4.5. Let G be a graph, and let Φ be a potential of the
form (4.1). For every choice of functions f1, . . . , fn where fi : S
N(i) →
11
R, the game with the payoffs
ui(a) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC) + fi(a
N(i))(4.6)
is a graphical potential game over G with the potential Φ.
Conversely, for every graphical potential game over G with potential
Φ there exist functions f1, ..., fn such that the payoffs are given by (4.6).
Proof. Let G be a game with payoffs ui, and let G
′ be the game with
payoffs
wi(a) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC).(4.7)
G ′ is a graphical potential game over G with the potential Φ; this was
proved in Theorem 4.4. The strategically equivalent transformation
ui = wi + fi(a
N(i)) preserves the potential function Φ. Moreover it
preserve the graphical structure as well, because fi depends only on
the strategy of the neighbors of i. Therefore G is a graphical potential
game over G with the potential Φ.
For the opposite direction, given a graphical potential game G over
G with the potential Φ, we know that the payoffs can be written as:
ui(a) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC) + gi(a−i)(4.8)
for some functions gi : S
−i → R. This follows from the fact that the
the games G and G ′ have the same potential function Φ, and therefore
are strategically equivalent.
The game G is graphical, therefore for every j /∈ N(i) ∪ {i} it holds
that g(a−i) = g((a−i)
j). Otherwise, j will have influence on i’s payoff.
Therefore g does not depend on aj , and it can be written as g(a−i) =
f(aN(i)), which completes the proof.

4.4. Equivalence of graphical potential games and Markov ran-
dom fields. In the proof of Theorem 4.1 we showed how every graph-
ical potential game on G can be mapped to a Markov random field on
G. We next show that this map is a bijection, so that every Markov
random field on G can be mapped back to the potential of a graphical
game on G.
Let MRF(G,S) ⊂ ∆(S) denote the set of probability measures on S
which describe positive Markov random fields with underlying graphG.
Let PGG(G,S) ⊂ RS be the set of normalized (as in (3.3)) potentials
12
of graphical potential games over G with strategy profiles in S. Define
ψ : PGG(G,S)→ MRF(G,S) by
[ψ(Φ)](a) = eΦ(a).(4.9)
This is the same mapping that we use in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proposition 4.6. The map ψ : PGG(G,S) → MRF(G,S) is a bijec-
tion.
Proof. It was shown in the proof of Theorem 4.1 that the image of ψ
is indeed in MRF(G,S). Since ψ is clearly one-to-one, it remains to be
shown that it is onto.
Let P ∈ MRF(G,S) be a distribution over S that is a positive MRF
over G. Then, by the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem it can be written
as
P [a] =
∏
C∈C(G)
eΦ
C(aC ),
for some functions ΦC :
∏
i∈C Si → R.
Define a game G on V with strategies in S by
ui(a) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC).
In the proof of Theorem 4.4 we showed that G is a graphical potential
game with the potential
Φ(a) =
∑
C∈C(G)
ΦC(aC),(4.10)
and therefore ψ(G) = P.

5. Better-response paths in graphical potential games.
In this section we make the simplifying assumption that utilities
take integer values, and in fact demand that each local potential is
integer2. Under these restrictions, we show how, in some families of
games, one can bound the total number of changes of strategy per
player, independently of the number of players in the game.
2The extension to real values is straightforward if instead of considering better-
response paths (see definition below) one considers ε-better-response paths, which
are paths where each updating player improves her payoff by at least ε.
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Definition 5.1. A game G with potential Φ over a graph G has M-
bounded local potentials if in the decomposition of the potential (4.1)
all the local potentials satisfy |ΦC(aC)| ≤ M for all aC . Here we do
not require Φ to be normalized as in (3.3). G is called an integral game
if all the local potentials are always integer.
A better-response path of length L is defined to be a sequence of
strategy profiles (a(t))Lt=0 such that a(t+1) differs from a(t) in exactly
one coordinate i = i(t) and ai(t+1) is a strict better-response to a−i(t).
Player i = i(t) is called the updating player at time t. Note that strict
best-response dynamics are a special case, and therefore our results will
apply to them, too.
An immediate observation regarding better-response dynamics is
that in an integral game, the length of a better-response path is bounded
by the range of the potential. This follows from the fact that in each
update the potential increases by at least one.
We analyze general better-response paths, without committing to a
particular order in which the player sequence {i(t)} is chosen. This
analysis, in particular, applies to continuous time better-response dy-
namics (or best-response dynamics) in which the path is drawn by
Poisson arrivals.
We define the clique-degree of a graph as the largest number of max-
imal cliques that any vertex in the graph participates in.3
Claim 5.2. For every n-player potential game on the graph G with M-
bounded local potentials, where the clique-degree of G is D, the potential
of the game is bounded by |Φ(a)| < nDM for all a ∈ S.
The claim follows from the fact that each vertex may participate in
at most D cliques.
An immediate consequence is that the length of any better-response
path is at most nDM . Hence, the average number of updates per-
formed by a player is at most DM , regardless of the size of the graph.
The next claim, which is the main theorem of this section, shows that
for graphs of slow enough growth (in a particular sense) we can bound
by a constant the total number of updates performed by any single
player, without having to average over all players.
Given a graph G, denote by ∆(i, j) the graph distance between two
nodes i and j in G. This is the length of a shortest path between i
3Note that in a graph of constant degree d, the clique-degree is trivially bounded
by the constant 2d, because the number of cliques that a vertex i participates in
is bounded by the number of subsets of neighbors of i. More interestingly, the
number of maximal cliques is sharply bounded by 4 · 3d/3, as was shown by Moon
and Moser [14].
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and j. Denote by Sr(G, i) the number of vertices at exactly distance r
from i:
Sr(G, i) = #{j : ∆(i, j) = r}.
Theorem 5.3. Let G be an integral potential game on the graph G
with M-bounded local potentials, where G has clique-degree D. Then
the number of times that a player k updates her strategy in any better-
response path is at most
2DM
∞∑
r=0
(
1−
1
2DM
)r
Sr(G, k).
The proof appears in Section 5.1. Before that, we give an example
of an application, introduce a consequence of this theorem on graphs
that satisfy a “slow enough growth” condition, and an example that
demonstrates the tightness of this condition.
The next example is a particular case of the game introduced in
Section 2.
Example 5.4. Let Z2n be the n×n two dimensional grid, and consider
the following game Gn in which each player has two strategies. Label
some subset of the edges blue and the rest red. The utility of each
player is equal to the number of neighbors along blue edges that match
her strategy, minus the number of neighbors along red edges that match
her strategy. It is easy to see that G is a graphical potential game on
Z
2
n, that local potentials are 1-bounded, that the clique-degree of Z
2
n is
four (since all maximal cliques are of size two and correspond to the
edges), and that Sr(Z
2, i) ≤ 4r.
Hence by Theorem 5.3, in any better-response path, no player changes
her strategy more than 1792 times, independently of n.
We generalize this example to a larger class of games and graphs.
Definition 5.5. Given a function f : N → R we say that the growth
of a graph G is bounded by f if for every vertex i and every r ∈ N it
holds that Sr(G, i) ≤ f(r).
In order to gain some intuition about the notion of the growth of the
graph let us mention several graphs and their growths:
• For a line or a cycle with n vertices, the growth is bounded by
f(r) = 2.
• The growth of the m-dimensional grid is bounded by f(r) =
(2mr)m−1, which is polynomial in r for a constant m.
• The growth of a binary tree is at least 2r, and therefore is
exponential in r.
15
A straightforward corollary from Theorem 5.3 is the following:
Corollary 5.6. Fix M , and let G be a graph with click-degree D and
with growth that is bounded from above by the following exponentially
increasing function
f(r) = c
(
1 +
1
4DM
)r
for some constant c > 0. Then for every potential game on the graph G
with M-bounded local potentials, the number of updates of every player
along every better-response path is bounded by the constant 8cD2M2.
In particular, this bound does not depend on the size of the graph.
Note that Corollary 5.6 holds, in particular, for the case where the
graph has any subexponential growth.
Proof of Corollary 5.6. By Theorem 5.3 we can bound the number of
updates by
2DM
∞∑
r=0
(
1−
1
2DM
)r
c
(
1 +
1
4DM
)r
≥ 2cDM
∞∑
r=0
(
1−
1
4DM
)r
= 8cD2M2.

The bound on the growth of the graph is crucial for the result of
Theorem 5.3 (and Corollary 5.6), as demonstrated by the following
example of a sequence of graphs of exponential growth, in which there
is no uniform bound on the number of strategy changes a player makes.
Example 5.7. We denote by BTk = (V,E) the binary tree graph of
depth k and n = 2k+1 − 1 vertices. For l = 0, ..., k we denote by
Vl = {v
l
1, ..., v
l
2l
} the set of vertices at depth-level l.
We consider the majority game G on BTk in which each player has
two strategies, and her utility is equal to the number of neighbors who
played the same strategy. As in Example 5.4, it is easy to see that G is a
graphical potential game on BTk, that local potentials are 1-bounded,
and that the clique-degree of G is three, since again all maximal cliques
correspond to edges. However, in this case Sr(BTk, i) ≥ 2
r for r < k,
and so we cannot hope to use Theorem 5.3 to bound the number of
changes without dependence on n. Indeed, we show that no such bound
exists, so that, as k grows, the number of strategy changes performed
by the level 0 player diverges.
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Consider the following better-response path.4 In the initial configu-
ration a(0) we set the strategy of all players to be 1 at even depth-levels
and (-1) at odd depth-levels (i.e., a(0)v = (−1)
l for v ∈ Vl). The players
update their strategies according to the following order, comprising k
“waves” of updates. The first wave consists of an update of the player
at depth 0 only. The second wave starts at all players at depth 1, and
then continues with the player at depth 0. The j’th wave starts with
all players at depth j − 1, then continues with all players at depth
j − 2, then j − 3 and so on, and finally ends with the player at depth
0. Formally, the order of updates is as follows:{
Step 1.1: All the players in V0.{
Step 2.1: All the players in V1.
Step 2.2: All the players in V0.

Step 3.1: All the players in V2.
Step 3.2: All the players in V1.
Step 3.3: All the players in V0.
...
Step l.j for 1 ≤ j ≤ l ≤ k: All the players in Vl−j.
...{
Step k.k: All the players in V0.
where at each step l.j the players in Vl−j update their strategies in an
arbitrary order.
Note that at each step l.j, every player v ∈ Vl−j indeed updates
her strategy, because the order is designed in such a way that both
v’s neighbors at depth-level l − j + 1 play the opposite strategy, and
player v has at most three neighbors. Note also that the root player
v01 updates her strategy k = log2(
n+1
2
) times. Namely the number
of her updates is not bounded by a constant. This is possible on a
sequence of growing binary trees because their growth rate is too high.
As Example 5.4 above shows, no such construction is possible on a
sequence of (polynomially) growing grids.
5.1. Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let G be a graph of clique-degree D
with n nodes, and let i be a vertex in G. Let C be a clique in G. We
4In fact, the presented path is also a best-response path.
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define ∆(i, C), the distance between i and C, as the minimal graph
distance between i and a vertex in C.
Given a potential Φ with M-bounded local potentials on G, let
λ = 1−
1
2DM
.
Fix a vertex k in G, and define the potential Θ by
Θ =
∑
C∈C(G)
λ∆(k,C)ΦC .
By the definition of better-response dynamics, Φ increases along any
better-response path. We claim that the same (weakly) holds for Θ.
This follows from the next claim.
Lemma 5.8. For every a ∈ S and b = (bi, a−i) ∈ S it holds that if
Φ(b) > Φ(a) then Θ(b) ≥ Θ(a).
In other words, the lemma claims that Θ is an ordinal potential (see
Monderer and Shapley [13]) of the game G.
Proof. Fix a and b such that Φ(b) > Φ(a). Since they differ only in the
strategy of i then
Φ(b)− Φ(a) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
,(5.1)
and likewise
Θ(b)−Θ(a) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
λ∆(k,C)
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
.(5.2)
Now, note that for any clique C that includes i it holds that either
∆(k, C) = ∆(k, i) or else ∆(k, C) = ∆(k, i)− 1. Hence, if we denote
C1 = {C ∈ C(G) : i ∈ C,∆(k, C) = ∆(k, i)}
and
C2 = {C ∈ C(G) : i ∈ C,∆(k, C) = ∆(k, i)− 1}
then we can write (5.2) as
Θ(b)−Θ(a)
λ∆(k,C)−1
= λ
∑
C∈C1
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
+
∑
C∈C2
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
=
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
− (1− λ)
∑
C∈C1
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
.
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By (5.1) this implies that
Θ(b)−Θ(a)
λ∆(k,C)−1
≥ Φ(b)− Φ(a)− (1− λ)
∑
C1
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
,
and by the definition of λ
≥ Φ(b)− Φ(a)−
1
2DM
∑
C1
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
.
Now, Φ(b) > Φ(a) implies Φ(b) − Φ(a) ≥ 1, since the potential is
integer. Hence
≥ 1−
1
2DM
∑
C1
[
ΦC(b)− ΦC(a)
]
.
But the summand has at most D terms, each one of which is strictly
less than 2M (because the local potentials are bounded by M). Hence
Θ(b)−Θ(a)
λ∆(k,C)−1
≥ 0,
which completes the proof of the claim. 
By the definition of Θ we have that
|Θ(a)| ≤
∑
C∈C(G)
λ∆(k,C)|ΦC(a)|.
Since |ΦC(a)| ≤M then
|Θ(a)| ≤
∑
C∈C(G)
λ∆(k,C)M
=M ·
∞∑
r=0
λr ·#{C ∈ C(G) : ∆(k, C) = r}.
Now, the number of cliques at distance r from k is at most D times
the number of vertices at distance r from k. Hence
|Θ(a)| ≤ DM
∞∑
r=0
λrSr(G, k).
Whenever player k updates her strategy to a better one, Φ increases
by at least 1, because the potential is integral. Note that a change of
strategy by player k changes only the value of the local potentials ΦC
such that k ∈ C (i.e., ∆(k, C) = 0). Therefore, an update of player
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k causes an increment by at least 1 (again because the potential is
integral) of the potential∑
C∈C(G) :∆(k,C)=0
ΦC =
∑
C∈C(G) : ∆(k,C)=0
λ∆(k,C)ΦC(5.3)
and causes no change in the potential∑
C∈C(G) :∆(k,C)≥1
λ∆(k,C)ΦC .(5.4)
Namely, every better response of player k causes an increment by at
least 1 of Θ, which is the sum the potentials in (5.3) and (5.4).
By Lemma 5.8 Θ is non-decreasing along a better response path.
Hence the total number of times that player k updates her strategy is
at most
2DM
∞∑
r=0
λrSr(G, k).
Finally, since λ = 1− 1/(2DM), it follows that the total number of
times that player k updates her strategy is at most
2DM
∞∑
r=0
(
1−
1
2DM
)r
Sr(G, k).
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.3.
6. Generalized graphical potential games.
Let G = (V,E) be a countably infinite graph, where the degree of
each node is finite.
Definition 6.1. A graphical game G on G is a generalized graphical
potential game if it is strategically equivalent to a game whose utilities
are given by
ui(a) =
∑
C∈C(G) : i∈C
ΦC(aC)
for some local potentials {ΦC}C∈C.
Note that G is not necessarily a potential game, as the sum of the
local potentials may diverge. However, given the decomposition of
graphical potential games into local potentials (Theorem 4.1), we find
that this is a natural generalization. Indeed, we show that like potential
games, generalized potential games always have pure Nash equilibria.
This follows from a compactness argument.
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Theorem 6.2. Every generalized potential game has a pure Nash equi-
librium.
Proof. Equip S =
∏
i Si with the product topology. Fix a player i, and
let Br = ∪s≤rSs be the set of players at distance at most r from i.
For each r > 0, choose a strategy profile ar ∈ S such that every
player in Br(i) is already best responding. This is possible, since if we
arbitrarily fix the strategies of the players outside Br(i), the induced
game on the players in Br(i) is a potential game, and therefore has a
pure Nash equilibrium. This follows from the definition of generalized
potential games by local potentials.
Since S is compact, the sequence ar will have a converging subse-
quence, with some limit a ∈ S. It is easy to see that a is a Nash
equilibrium. 
Note that unlike finite potential games, in a generalized potential
game a better-response path does not necessarily reach an equilibrium.
However, under the appropriate conditions on the game and growth
rate of the graph, we now show that every better-response path con-
verges to an equilibrium.
To this end, we define the clique-degree of an infinite graph as for
finite graphs, although in this case it may diverge. Likewise, the defini-
tion of M-boundedness can be used, since it only depends on the local
potentials.
The statement of the next theorem is identical to that of Theo-
rem 5.3, with the exception that it refers more widely to generalized
graphical potential games. An inspection of the proof of Theorem 5.3
will reveal that it applies here too.
Theorem 6.3. Let G be an integral generalized potential game on the
graph G with M-bounded local potentials, where G has clique-degree D.
Then the number of times that a player k updates her strategy in any
better-response path is at most
2DM
∞∑
r=0
(
1−
1
2DM
)r
Sr(G, k).
Note that the bound in Theorem 6.3 may be infinite (for example, in
graphs of sufficiently fast exponential growth) or finite (for example, in
graph of subexponential growth), in which case it is easy to show that
it is finite for all k ∈ V . When the bound is infinite, the statement of
the theorem is vacuous. However, when the bound is finite, it follows
that in any better response path the strategies of all players converge.
We end the paper by formally stating this observation.
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Theorem 6.4. Let G be an integral generalized potential game on the
graph G with M-bounded local potentials, where G has clique-degree D,
and where
2DM
∞∑
r=0
(
1−
1
2DM
)r
Sr(G, k)
is finite for some (equivalently, all) k ∈ V . In any better-response
path (which may be infinite), each player makes only a finite number
of strategy changes.
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Appendix A. Markov properties of positive random fields.
Let G = (V,E) be a finite simple graph with |V | = n, and let
X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be random field on G. Recall that we say that X
is positive if P [X1 = a1, . . . , Xn = an] > 0 whenever P [Xi = ai] > 0
for i = 1, . . . , n. We say that X has the pairwise Markov property if
for all (i, j) 6∈ E it holds that Xi is independent of Xj, conditioned on
XV \{i,j}. In this section we prove the following proposition.
Proposition A.1. If X is positive and has the pairwise Markov prop-
erty then it is a Markov random field.
To prove this proposition we will need the following lemma. Let G1,2
be the graph derived from G by amalgamating the nodes 1 and 2 into
a node (1, 2); the vertices of G1,2 are V 1,2 = {(1, 2), 3, . . . , n}, and the
edges of G1,2 are
E1,2 = {(i, j) ∈ E : i, j > 2} ∩ {((1, 2), j) : j > 2, (1, j) ∈ E or (2, j) ∈ E}.
Accordingly, let X1,2 = ((X1, X2), X3, . . . , Xn) be the associated ran-
dom field, where we unite the two random variables X1 and X2 into
the random variable (X1, X2), and associate it to the node (1, 2). Gen-
erally, define Gi,j and X i,j likewise.
Lemma A.2. When X is positive and has the pairwise Markov prop-
erty with respect to G, then X i,j is positive and has the pairwise Markov
property, with respect to Gi,j.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1 and j = 2. It
is immediate that X1,2 is positive.
Every vertex k that is connected to either 1 or 2 in the graph G, is
connected to (1, 2) in G1,2. Therefore, for proving the pairwise property
on the graph G1,2 we will consider a vertex k such that neither (1, k)
nor (2, k) is an edge in G, so that ((1, 2), k) is not an edge in G1,2.
Without loss of generality, we assume that k = 3. We will show that,
conditioned on Y = XV \{1,2,3}, (X1, X2) is independent of X3. This
will prove the claim.
Denote by Si the (finite) support of Xi. We would like to show that
for all a1 ∈ S1, a2 ∈ S2 and a3 ∈ S3 it holds that
P [(X1, X2, X3) = (a1, a2, a3)|Y ]
= P [(X1, X2) = (a1, a2)|Y ] · P [X3 = a3|Y ] .
Since X is positive P [X3 = a3|Y, (X1, X2) = (a1, a2)] is well defined,
and we can apply the pairwise Markov property of X once to X1, X3
and once to X2, X3 to arrive at
P [X3 = a3|Y, (X1, X2) = (a1, a2)]
= P [X3 = a3|Y,X1 = a1](A.1)
= P [X3 = a3|Y,X2 = a2] .(A.2)
Since X is positive we can apply the same argument with any b2 ∈ S2
substituted for a2, and conclude, as in (A.2), that
P [X3 = a3|Y,X1 = a1] = P [X3 = a3|Y,X2 = b2]
for all b2 ∈ S2, and that therefore
P [X3 = a3|Y,X1 = a1] = P [X3 = a3|Y ] .
Applying (A.1) now yields
P [X3 = a3|Y, (X1, X2) = (a1, a2)] = P [X3 = a3|Y ] ,
which proves the claim. 
Proof of Proposition A.1. Let A be a (U,W )-cut. We would like to
show that XU is independent of XW , conditioned on XA.
Amalgamate all the vertices in U to a single vertex, and likewise
amalgamate A and W . The resulting graph is (a subgraph of)
G′ = (V ′, E ′) = ({U,A,W}, {(U,A), (A,W )}),
and the associated random field is precisely (XU , XA, XW ). By re-
peated applications of Lemma A.2 this graph has the pairwise Markov
property, and hence XU is independent of XW , conditioned on XA. 
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